Het artikel is interessant omdat het duidelijk de Turkse claims op Cyprus en de Aegeïsche Zee en de Griekse eilanden weergeeft. En de strategische waarde van dit gebied.
De claim op de Aegeïsche Zee en de Griekse eilanden is een paar dagen geleden nog herhaald in de Turkse krant Hurriyet daily. Dit in verband met de Grieken die van plan zijn om met olieboringen in die zee te beginnen.
Syrië, Cyprus, de Griekse eilanden strategisch belangrijk voor controle te houden over het Oostelijk deel van de Middellandse Zee. Bevatten olie en gas die de Turkse economie kan redden. Vergeet niet dat Standards & Poors gisteren de rating van Turkije verlaagd heeft naar BBB- en dat Turkije 10% rente betaalt op zijn staatsobligaties. (dit is meer dan Griekenland) Rente die het in dollars moet betalen, terwijl de Turkse Lira dit jaar 20% gedevalueerd is tov de dollar.
Via Syrië staat voor Turkije veel op het spel. Niet de mensenrechten van de Syriërs. Controle op de olie en het gas dat de Turkse economie moet redden + strategisch heerschappij over het Oostelijk deel van de Middellandse Zee.
Hetzelfde geldt voor Europa. Een eigen en onafhankelijke olie-en gasvoorziening is een uitkomst uit de crisis en levenslijn naar de toekomst.
Strategisch is de Middellandse Zee Mare Nostra, Een deel Mare Nostra mogen we niet zomaar uit handen geven aan een schurkenstaat die sinds het ontstaan van internationaal recht dit aan zijn voeten veegt.
De Fransen, die geen vrienden van Turkije zijn, lijken door te hebben dat Turkije in Syrië een voortrekkersrol laten spelen in het nadeel van Europa is. Via Bashar Assad Syrië aan Iran geven ook niet.
Blijft de enige oplossing: Syrië voor een paar decennia in burgeroorlog storten, hopen dat er besmetting naar Iran is en Griekenland (of Cyprus) de Russen een zeehaven laten geven. Dit op Grieks Nationale gronden, (verlichting van crisis) niet EU of NATO.De Russen zullen met plezier Turkije mee in de tang nemen.
Er is ook een interessant hoofdstuk over hoe de Dhimmi onder Ottomaans bewind leefden. Oorsprong van de verticaal geöriënteerde Turkse bullebakpolitiek.
Achilles’ heel of Turks on the Cyprus issue
In memory of the well respected late Professor Neoklis Sarris we republish in English one of his insightful articles on the website of the Greek daily “To Paron” on 17/01/2010
Greek-Turkish relations 33 years ago
Two years after the invasion of Turkish troops in Cyprus, Ankara believed that it had “solved” the Cyprus problem and that it was a matter of time before the Greek side accepted the new reality. Next in Ankara’s agenda was a network of other issues, with the priority given to the Aegean issue, which under the guise of delineating the continental shelf (with time the theories of “gray” areas were also added to the Aegean issue), had the same targeting as in the case of Cyprus: a peculiar Greek-Turkish condominium under a Turkish domination, best described by the saying “what is mine is mine and what is yours is mine.”
Essentially it was an evident revival of the Ottoman viewing of relations arising from the power structure of this historical type, which, as we will later explain, remained apparently unchanged not only in political level, but also in social representations of the Turks, in ethnic stereotypes and in the establishment of their basic or foundational personality in terms of Social Psychology.
However, this disappointing scenery had a couple of Achilles’ heels that could only be spotted by a watchful eye and that were indirectly but clearly pinpointed by the very same Turkish sources which were responsible for the entire design. Beyond what I already mentioned, Turan Güneş explained me in detail the reasons why Turkey is afraid and tries to avoid the partition of Cyprus. With the wisdom that characterized him, he had even predicted what could happen in the case of the partition of the island. For example, in the part of the island that would be placed under Greece’s control, ballistic weapon systems could be installed that could threaten even central Asia Minor (if someone studies the book of Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Foreign Minister of Turkey, “Strategic Depth” he will discover the fear caused to Ankara by the possible installation of S-300 missiles in Cyprus – a similar operation to that of Makarios which was aborted in 1964, and had made him known as the “Castro of the Mediterranean”).
Thus, according to Güneş, Turkey “aims to control the whole of Cyprus.” This intention is not directly related to the existence of Turkish Cypriots, but relates to the broader interests of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Besides, Davutoglu, in our days in his book, provocatively states that “if there were no Turks in Cyprus” Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus would be the same because its interests as a leading power in this wider geo-strategic location are at stake. To further substantiate his claim he also states that the same happens with the islands in the Aegean “that Greece occupies”, such as the Dodecanese, which, although not many Turks live there today, Turkey shows (or should show) an interest similar to Cyprus. Based on the above the goal of Turkey is the control of the Republic of Cyprus, namely its transformation into a miserable puppet of Ankara. But how can this happen?
The advantage of the international personality
There is no doubt that the current situation in Cyprus is a direct result of the shameful Zurich – London agreements, when the then Greek leadership succumbed to the blackmail, supported by the UK (and the U.S.), of the Turkish draft constitution. However, these agreements gave an advantage to Greece which also functioned as an obstacle to Turkey. As pointed out by Ismet Inonu in his speech in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in his capacity as leader of the Opposition during the debate on the ratification of the agreements of Zurich, having congratulated the elected government of Menderes for unexpected diplomatic success, noted that the profits earned by Turkey are vanishing because of the international legal personality given to the Republic of Cyprus, which will be a member of the UN and other international organizations and will receive international recognition. So in the future no one can prejudge the policy followed by this country. To avoid just this risk, as it was revealed a few months before the invasion in 1974 by Nourettin Vergkin (the Turkish ambassador at the time of the Zurich – London talks), Turkey managed to get the Treaty of Guarantee signed under which military forces could be sent to the island. According to the Turkish diplomat, the Greek side had then been aware of this “backdoor”, but it did not seem able to eliminate it.
The Ottoman structures of Zürich and London Agreements
In conclusion, the words of Günes implied a reorganization of the state in Cyprus on a new basis, where the bi-federal (and bi-zonal) basis (as a principle of a cooperation based on 50-50% for the two parts) was inevitable. But no solution will be provided for the return of refugees to their homes. The Greeks should accept the new status quo. The divorce was final and irrevocable.
In order to understand the Turkish intentions we should refer to the relevant expressions used in Turkish, which indicate the forms of coexistence. The first of these is the ic – ice which means “the one inside the other” that is, the mixing. The second is yan – yana (the one next to another), ie together and at the same time apart and the third ayri – ayri, which means absolutely separate. The term used by my interlocutor was the last. This Turkish targeting cannot be understood without delving in the lifestyles of various ethnic-religious communities in the Ottoman period based on the structure mentioned above.
For centuries, non-Muslim communities (cemmaati gayri muslimin) lived in cities (as well as in villages) in separate neighborhoods (in some cities like the Fener in Istanbul, they lived surrounded by walls where the gate was closed at night). This refers to the places of residence and domicile. We say residence because it was forbidden even for people with the shame ethnicity and religion but having different religious dogma, to stay in the same house. For instance a Greek Catholic Christian could not be feasted or rent a house from a Greek Orthodox Christian at the risk of excommunication of the host or the landlord. The only common area for all communities was the market (the “bazaar”) and buildings of the administration. This is the way of “together apart” and corresponds to “a social type” found in traditional societies like the Osmanic. In other words being a traditional society this formation, the ghettoisation, as we say today, was functional, as the ethnic-religious (racial) discrimination was also functional. Non-Muslims were obliged to carry garments of fabrics of inferior quality of what Muslims carried or at least of a different color. They were also obliged to have shoes with color corresponding to their religion. Moreover, they had the obligation to bend their knees when a Muslim passed in front of them (a habit which survived until recently in the villages of Asia Minor by fanatical Muslim women that they did so at the sight of men – a sign of respect and obedience to them). Even the houses of non-Muslims could not be painted white (they were painted in dark colors) and they should had a clearly lower height than the Muslim houses. All this was the result of the principle on which the first in rank of non-Muslims followed the last class Muslim. This is a principle by which derives the double criterion applied by the Turks in their relations with Greece (but usually also with the Greeks living for a long time with them). This double criterion is indicative of the power structure that governs the relations of Turkey based on the perception of vertical relations with others whom they consider to be subjective as weakest to their own power. Once, in a friendly conversation with my colleague, the very well known professor of history Zafer Toprak of University of Bosphorus (who was also student of my teacher Tarik Zafer Tounagia) responded to my comment that “nothing can be done Zafer, because the Turks perceive their relationships with others vertically, not horizontally” by standing up and telling me that “I want to kiss you, you x-rayed the soul of the Turks” (sen Turklerin ruhunu rontgen etmissin).
Parenthetically it should be emphasized that these are not only related to Cyprus, but to the whole complex of Greek-Turkish relations as well. In Cyprus, as we already mentioned, the Treaty of London was built on top of the Osmanic principle of ethnic-religious communities in a very rough way, because it was based on splitting communities to Muslims – non-Muslims. Proof of this is that communities of Armenians, Maronites and Latins of Cyprus were calculated (and counted) in the percentage of Rums (as they call the Greek Cypriots, while the other side was called the muslim not the Turkish).
The third shape of coexistence and Cyprus
The third shape of coexistence between Greeks and Turks under mixed populations was the result of efforts to westernize the Osman state since 1838 (since the English-Turkish economic agreement), attested by timid (not as declarations but as to their application) steps with the Declaration of Tanzimat the following year. This does not mean that in cities the several ethnic –religious districts, such as the Greek, Armenia, Jewish, European and Turkish, disappeared. Simply the rigorous rule bent, and especially the European – oriented Osmans moved to ‘European Quarters’, in which initially the non-Muslims were mixed with the Europeans (the main example is the Pera of Istanbul, where foreign embassies were based as well as the relevant shopping center). It should be noted however that this shape, which corresponds to the type of modern (and hence open) society, assumes the default political equality of citizens, who for that reason cease to be subjects and exercise their dividend of political authority at least as far as their economic power allows them to do so (either as equity or as labor and especially in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy).
A major drawback of the Osman system was that its social modernization (in the form of Westernization or Europeanization) had different rates in different ethnic and religious communities. And social modernization in this case means accepting very deep changes in mentality, starting from the economy and leading to the formation of a hitherto unknown social conscience, completely contrary to that dictated by the quasi-”feudal” Osmanic structures. Pioneers were the Greeks, Armenians and Western nationals of course, while the Jews were delayed, being cut off from other Jews in Europe who had meanwhile progressed, so this is why they later wanted to cooperate with the Turks who had also delayed to develop. (Those that last shed the relationships discussed and modernize in the given sense at a rapid pace over the last forty years, are the Kurds.)
The above disadvantage of the Osmanic structure and the resulting culture of power that dominates the Turks / Muslims resulted in not giving substantial political dividends to non-Muslims, and when the opportunity was given (1912 – 1922) to expel them in every way from the country while usurping the economy controlled at incomparably greater extent than their population proportion. This translates into genocide and compulsory exchange of populations. So now it was possible (according to Turkish standards) to operate an “open society” that embodied the wanted modernization. A copy of this very social process developed and tends to formalize with the agreement ante portas in Cyprus.
From the above it is obvious that the main intention of Turkey towards Cyprus was the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus as a legal international personality and the enforcement not of a dichotomy, but of a peculiar “confederal” state where the Turkish minority of 18%, which over the years will become a majority by the settlers from Turkey or the freely displaced populations from the European Union, will be able to have complete control throughout the State of Cyprus (to support that I should also refer to the observation of the “father” of the Zurich agreement Nihat Erim, who in his report to the Turkish government in 1956 he was pleased, that “the majority of Greeks in Cyprus is occasional and may in time be reversed”).
I deliberately say “State of Cyprus” and not the “Republic of Cyprus” because the Annan Plan provided for the dissolution of the Republic and its substitution by a new state that would meet the specifications of Turkey (and whose ardent devotees were almost all Greek politicians as well as the “politically correct or decent” opinion leaders and “serious” academic teachers in Greece). It was later revealed that local supporters of this shameful plan for Cyprus received funding by foreign centers. But apparently the new plan discussed during the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue between Turkey (which uses the pseudonym of Talat) and President Christofias also tends to the dissolution of the Republic. It seems that now is the time for Greeks in Greece and Cyprus to “digest” (the words of Günes in 1976) the fait accompli in 1974. Time will tell.
www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2011/11 ... rus-issue/